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AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS AND JUDICIAL REvIEw: A
SEARCH FOR LIMITATIONS ON THE CONTROLLING
EFFECT GIVEN AGENCY STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTIONS
Kevin W. Saunders*
Judicial oversight of the efforts of administrative agencies in construing
the terms of the statutes they administer has declined steadily. Where courts
once merely deferred to some degree to the agency view of the meaning of a
statute, such agency interpretations are now granted controlling effect in
most, if not all, cases. This shrinking role for the judiciary comes despite the
courts' traditional and statutory' task of providing meaning for statutory
terms.
Section I of this Article traces the development of the judiciary's grant
of controlling effect to agency interpretations. Section II then suggests limi-
tations on that grant. Those limitations would require that some statutory
constructions, now accorded controlling effect, no longer be so insulated
from judicial review.
I. THE DECLINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTIONS
When the administration of a statute is entrusted to an administrative
agency, the agency is naturally faced with questions as to what the statutory
terms mean.2 Both the agency staff and the public must know how the
agency plans to construe the statute. This ensures a consistent agency inter-
pretation and permits the public to conform its actions to the dictates of the
statute. The administrative agencies are thus regularly involved in issues of
statutory construction. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., Franklin & Marshall College;
M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan.
1. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
2. See K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:1, at 55 (2d ed. 1979 & 1982
Supp.)("When Congress enacts a statute and assigns the administration of it to an agency, the
agency encounters questions the statute does not answer and the agency must answer them. The
agency heads must instruct their staffs what to do about such questions .... ").
3. See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpreta-
tive Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 118
(1971)("An active agency with a broad mandate... may formally or informally take positions on
literally hundreds of questions with regard to the proper construction of the statutes or regulations it
administers each month.").
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The rules an agency issues in its efforts to inform its staff and the public
in the course of its statutory construction are known as interpretative rules.4
These interpretative rules, when subject to judicial review, have historically
been accorded less binding effect than that enjoyed by legislative or substan-
tive rules.5 While legislative rules are set aside only if "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law... [or] in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu-
tory right,"' 6 courts historically have not been required to give effect to an
interpretative regulation. Rather, "[v]arying degrees of deference [have
been] accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as
the timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its
expertise."'7
While the degree of deference afforded interpretative rules historically
may have varied, the trend is toward subjecting interpretative rules to less
stringent judicial review. Developments in recent years have blurred the dis-
tinction between legislative and interpretative rules to the point where at
least some,8 and perhaps all, 9 interpretative rules are now accorded legisla-
tive effect and may be set aside only under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard.
This bestowing of controlling effect on some or all interpretative rules
comes despite an early history that indicates that interpretative rules were to
have very little, if any, effect on the later construction of a statute by a court.
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in its original
4. In fact, the Attorney General's Manual definition of interpretative rules is limited to an
agency's efforts at enlightening its staff and the public. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MAN-
UAL] (defining interpretative rules as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of
the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers"). Professor Schwartz, while
using the label "interpretive," rather than "interpretative," similarly defines such rules as "state-
ments as to what the agency thinks a statute or regulation means; they are statements issued to
advise the public of the agency's construction of the law it administers." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 4.6, at 159 (2d ed. 1984)(footnote omitted). While Professor Davis appears to treat
interpretative rules as having a broader extension, defining such rules as "any rule an agency issues
without exercising delegated legislative power to make law through rules," K. DAVIS, supra note 2,
§ 7:8, at 36, he clearly includes agency constructions of statutes within the class of interpretative
rules. See K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:11, at 56 ("When an adminstrator either gives meaning to a
statute or answers a question that cannot be answered by finding the meaning in the statute, and
when he states in general terms what he is doing, the statement is called an 'interpretative rule,'
whether or not anything is in fact interpreted.").
5. Professor Davis defines legislative rules as "the product of an exercise of delegated legisla-
tive power to make law through rules." K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:8, at 36. Professor Schwartz
uses the term "substantive rule" but also defines such rules as those that are "issued pursuant to
statutory authority and implement the statute; they create law just as the statute itself does, by
changing existing rights and obligations." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 4.6, at 158 (footnote omit-
ted). The Attorney General's Manual also uses the term "substantive rule," and defines such rules as
"rules, other than organizational or procedural .... issued by an agency pursuant to statutory au-
thority and which implement the statute...." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at
30 n.3.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
7. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977)(citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
8. See Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for
Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346.
9. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30
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1946 form, provided that "[s]o far as necessary to decision and where
presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, in-
terpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of any agency action." 10
While the language of the statute does not directly address the situation
in which an administrative agency has already offered its view as to the
meaning of a statutory provision, neither is such review exempted from the
requirement that a court decide all questions of law and interpret statutory
provisions. In such cases it is uncertain what effect the previous statutory
construction by the agency should have on the court's determination; that is,
what scope or standard of review is to be employed by a court in reviewing
an agency's interpretative rules? The legislative history of the APA might be
interpreted as indicating that the agency determination was to have little or
no effect on the court's construction of the statute. The report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, in explaining section 10(e), states that the "sub-
section provides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to
decide in the last analysis...."1 The report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary contains the same explanation.1 2
Although even these reports do not state the standard of review to be
employed by the court, they do indicate that it is the courts that decide on
the construction of a statute. The Senate Committee's discussion of the bill
supports this conclusion. In justifying the exemption of interpretative rules
from the requirement that they be adopted only after notice and comment,
while requiring such procedures in the adoption of legislative rules, the Sen-
ate Committee explained that "'interpretative' rules-as merely interpreta-
tions of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review, whereas
'substantive' rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion."' 3 A
similar position was espoused, during the floor debate, by Senator McCar-
ren, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 14 Accord-
ingly, the legislative history could be taken to indicate that not even
deference must be accorded the interpretative rules promulgated by an
agency.
10. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). The current version of the
Adminstrative Procedure Act leaves this provision essentially unchanged. See 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982)("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean-
ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action.").
11. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 185, 214 (1946).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 233, 278 (1946).
13. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1946), re-
printed in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 18 (1946)(emphasis added).
14. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 313 (1946)(interpretative
rules are exempt from notice and comment because "interpretative rules, being merely adaptations of
interpretations of statutes, are subject to a more ample degree of judicial review"). While Senator
McCarren's statement might not be viewed as being as strong as that found in the Senate Committee
print, the Senator was clearly of the view that interpretative rules would receive more stringent
review than that afforded legislative rules under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
1988]
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A. The Early Case Law
Despite what the legislative history may say, interpretative rules have
not, of course, received plenary review.' 5 In fact, the state of the law even at
the time of the adoption of the APA did not provide for plenary review of
interpretative rules. Prior to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.;16 the Court had al-
ready examined the effect to be given an agency's interpretation. Skidmore
concerned an interpretative bulletin and informal rulings promulgated by
the Administrator of the United States Department of Labor's Wage and
Hour Division. The Court held that the administrator's views provide gui-
dance to the courts and have power to persuade.1 7 While the Administra-
tor's construction of a statute was not to have controlling effect on the
courts, neither did the courts write on the clean slate that would exist with-
out the prior construction and that might be expected in plenary review. 8,
Arguably, Skidmore lacked precedential value after the passage of the
APA. The Skidmore Court noted, before determining that some deference
would be paid to the Administrator's construction, that there was "no statu-
tory provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the Admin-
istrator's conclusions."' 9 After the passage of the APA, courts might have
determined that henceforth there was a statutory provision as to what defer-
ence was due, and that the APA required plenary review with no defer-
ence.20 That, however, has not been the course of the law, and Skidmore
enjoyed a long history as precedent for the grant of deference to statutory
construction by administrative agencies.
2 1
15. See infra notes 16-94 and accompanying text.
16. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
17. We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
18. Professor Davis suggests that a court may be true to the APA provision that reviewing
courts are to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982),
and still take into account the agency view.
[E]ven when it makes its own decision, it may be influenced by the agency's view, and it
may even say that it "defers" to that view. In making its own decision of a question of law,
a court may rely on its esteem and respect for the specialized understanding of the agency,
withotit violating the APA's requirement that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law."
K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 29:16, at 399. Nonetheless, it is at least questionable whether such review
should be considered plenary review.
19. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
20. Whether or not this was the view of Congress in 1946, such a view was unable to muster the
necessary support for passage in a later era. Congress, several times, considered but failed to pass
the Bumpers Amendment, which would have required courts to decide de novo all questions of law
and statutory construction with no presumption of validity given to agency views. See, e.g., S. 1766
and H.R. 1776, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
21. See, eg., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 120 (1980);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Morton'v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974);
National Distrib. Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1980); British
Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
[VCol. 30
HeinOnline -- 30 Ariz. L. Rev.  772 1988
AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Depending on the presence or absence of the factors presented in Skid-
more, courts have granted more or less deference to agency statutory con-
struction. Courts give some interpretations "the greatest deference."' 22 On
the other hand, "[d]eference for an agency's interpretation of law is typically
unmentioned in Supreme Court opinions in which the Court substitutes its
interpretation for the agency's." 23 In the view of Professor Davis, "defer-
ence seems to be absent whenever the Court disagrees with the agency's in-
terpretation. 'Deference' thus becomes a concept that is useful when the
Court is in doubt about an interpretation but is satisfied to let the agency's
decision stand." 24 If Professor Davis is correct, courts after Skidmore
clearly decided the relevant questions of law, and such review might even be
viewed as having been plenary. If not, courts decided upon the relevant
questions of law, but their review was less than plenary.
B. Express Delegations of Authority
Whatever may have been the role of deference after Skidmore, a court
"always ha[d] power to substitute judgment for that of the agency in deter-
mining the content of interpretative rules." 25 - That situation changed in
1977, at least for a class of interpretative rules, with Batterton v. Francis.26
In Batterton the Court considered an interpretation of the Social Security
Act by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The Act provides
that the term "dependent child" includes a needy child "who has been de-
prived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as deter-
mined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) .of his
father...." 27 The dispute arose over whether persons out of work as the
result of labor disputes are unemployed for purposes of the statute.
Rather than answer the question based on its own view of the meaning
of statutory terms, the Court adopted the Secretary's view. Importantly, the
Court did not do so out of mere deference to the Secretary. Rather, the
Court noted that Congress had expressly delegated to the Secretary the
power to determine what constitutes unemployment.
In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather
than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statu-
tory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regu-
lations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside
those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute
in a different manner.
The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more
22. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56
(1981).
23. K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 29:16, at 403.
24. Id.
25. K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 7:13, at 59.
26. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). Batterton cited United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1936); and the Attorney General's Manual, supra note 4,
at 30 n.3, as support for its conclusions regarding the scope of review. While the cited sources do
support the Court's conclusion, Batterton presented a particularly clear statement of the law. See
infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976)(emphasis added).
1988]
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than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary
exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."
2 8
Thus, the Court established that there was a sub-class of interpretative rules,
for which authority to construe the statute in question had been expressly
delegated to the administrative agency. The courts were to play a minimal
role, affording the agency's view controlling weight.29
While Professor Davis may have correctly suggested that a court can
adhere to the APA provision that reviewing courts are to "decide all rele-
vant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,"'30
and still consider an agency view that was merely due deference, 31 his sug-
gestion rings hollow when the agency's construction is given controlling
weight. The court, rather than deciding what the law means, decides only
whether the agency's view of what the law means is reasonable. The court,
therefore, does not fulfill the role the APA envisioned.
Although the courts do not live up to their APA role in the Batterton
class of cases, 32 there is at least a statutory basis for abdicating that role.
Batterton rested on the express delegation to the agency of the authority to
construe the statute in question. Thus, the APA directive that courts are to
decide all questions of law and construe all statutory terms could be consid-
ered superceded by the explicit delegation of authority to the agency to con-
strue particular statutes which by their own terms are excepted from the
general APA rule.33
28. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425-26 (citations omitted)(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (1982)).
29. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984)("Because Congress explicitly dele-
gated authority to construe the statute by regulation, in this case we must give the regulations legis-
lative and hence controlling weight, unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the
statute.")(emphasis added).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
31. See supra note 18.
32. See, eg., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1983); Herwig v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981); INS v.
Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
33. Professor Monaghan, in discussing the grant of deference to agency statutory constructions,
pointed out that courts do not abdicate their judicial function.
The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an inquiry that includes
defining the range of permissible criteria. In such an empowering arrangement, responsi-
bility for meaning is shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to specify what
the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that it does mean. In
this context the court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to "say what the law is" by
deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as "made" by the
authorized law-making entity. Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by fail-
ing to defer to the interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been
delegated law-making authority.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1, 27-28 (1983).
Professor Monaghan's point applies with equal force to the grant of controlling effect to statu-
tory interpretations issued under an express legislative grant to the administrative agency to con-
strue. Where Congress has delegated such authority, and assuming the delegation is permissible (see
infra notes 155-89 and accompanying text), a failure by the courts to grant the agency interpretation
the same effect as that due a statute would be violative of legislative supremacy.
[Vol. 30
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C. Implicit Delegations of Authority
The next major erosion in the court's authority to overturn agencies'
constructions of statutes came in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.3 4 Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection
Agency's construction of the Clean Air Act.3 5 Specifically, the Court deter-
mined whether the statutory term "stationary source" could be construed, as
the agency had chosen, to include an entire industrial plant.36 Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. brought suit challenging the Environmental
Protection Agency's "bubble concept" construction of "stationary source."
Once again, the Court did not grant the agency view mere deference,
but instead granted controlling weight. More significantly, however, the
Court did so without finding an explicit delegation to the agency of the au-
thority to construe the statute. The Court first noted the need for adminis-
trative agencies to fill the gaps left in statutes, and that the gaps could have
been left either implicitly or explicitly by Congress.37 If Congress explicity
left the gap for the agency to fill, then in line with Batterton, there would be
express delegation of the authority to construe, and the construction would
enjoy controlling weight.38 The Court went further, however, and stated
that "[s]ometimes the legislative delegation ... is implicit rather than ex-
plicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administra-
tor of an agency."'3 9
While there is language in the opinion that might have limited the
Court's holding to cases in which a court decided that Congress actually had
no intent with regard to the point at issue,4° there is other language that
34. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 111(a), 129(b), 301(a), 91 Stat.
685, 704, 747, 770 (1977)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(3), 7502(b)(6), 76020)(1982)).
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982) provides:
The plan provisions required by subsection (a) shall-...
(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major statio-
nary sources in accordance with section 7503 [regarding requirements for permits].
36. The Environmental Protection Agency's regulations allowed states to adopt the plantwide
definition of "stationary source." The regulations provide:
(i) "Stationary source" means any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.
(ii) "Building, structure, facility, or installation" means all of the pollution emitting
activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or more contig-
uous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person (or persons
under common control) except the activities of any vessel.
40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983).
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
38. Id. at 843-44.
39. Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
40. See id. at 845.
T]he Court of Appeals misconceived the nature, of its role in reviewing the regalations at
issue. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did
not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit
program designed, the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is 'inap-
propriate' in the general context of a program to improve air quality, but whether the
Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a
reasonable one.
Id.
"The basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the
1988]
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indicates wider applicability. The Court established a two-part test. First, it
must be determined whether Congress directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue, and if the congressional intent is clear, the court and agency
must give it effect. 4 1
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.42
Chevron thus expanded the class of statutory constructions due control-
ling effect.4 3 Not only was a court to give legislative effect to a statutory
construction issued under explicit authority to construe, but such effect was
also due constructions issued under implicit authority to construe. Further-
more, such implicit delegation to construe appeared to be found merely in
the fact that the statute was ambiguous on the point at issue. Once again,
the role of the courts had been scaled back from that envisioned in the APA.
In still another class of cases the courts were not to provideplenary review of
agency interpretations 4 and, at least with regard to substantive content,
45
were no longer to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action."
4 6
Furthermore, the change in the courts' role was based on grounds more
suspect than those on which the Batterton change stood. Whereas Batterton
resulted from an explicit delegation to the agency to construe the statute,
Chevron relied on an implicit delegation. In the Batterton line of cases Con-
gress expressly provided that, for certain statutes, the general APA dictate to
the courts to construe constitutional and statutory provisions had been
term 'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that defini-
tion." Id. at 842.
41. Id. at 842-43.
42. Id. at 843.
43. Chevron did cite precedent for its view that implicit delegations of authority to construe
leads to controlling effect. See id, at 844 n.13 (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144
(1981); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975)), but the precedent
is not as clear as the Chevron position, and Chevron may be viewed as a "departure from precedent,"
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 250 (1984).
44. See supra note 18.
45. But see supra note 33.
The court has, of course, interpreted for itself the procedural aspects of the statute in determin-
ing that it must grant controlling effect to the agency construction.
Statutory law itself is a source of positive law that may offer courts guidance in determin-
ing the correct mode of statutory interpretation .... The extent to which courts should
defer to agency interpretations of law is ultimately 'a function of Congress' intent on the
subject as revealed in the particular statutory scheme at issue.'" The courts must, in other
words, follow the legislature's "interpretative intent" [sic] as much as its substantive intent.
Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. RPv. 549, 570 (1985)(quot-
ing Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir.
1982)(en banc)(quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (lst
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983), and Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 215-16 (1980)(using the phrase "interpretive intent"))).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
[Vol. 30
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superceded by particular statutory provisions making certain statutory con-
structions the province of the agencies, subject only to "arbitrary and capri-
cious" review. The implicit delegation of Chevron provides a much weaker
basis for concluding that Congress had superceded the APA directive to the
courts. Yet, so long as the delegation is real, though implicit, there is a basis
for the courts' abandonment of the duty assigned by the APA. The question
remains whether there really is an implicit delegation to the agency to con-
strue when Congress has not directly addressed the point at issue, or has
done so only ambiguously.
Even after the Chevron decision, it was still possible to argue that not
every ambiguity would serve as the basis for finding an implicit delegation.47
Chevron itself involved a technical question and the interpretation of what
could be considered a technical term. Historically courts have granted def-
erence to interpretative rulings involving technical areas requiring agency
expertise.4 8 Had Chevron been seen as merely a change from providing def-
erence to providing controlling effect for that class of interpretative rules,4 9
the change would not have been as drastic as that encompassed in a holding
that controlling effect was due whenever there was silence or any ambiguity,
technical or not.
Additionally, Chevron involved a conflict between the policies the stat-
ute was intended to address. 50 Again, it was already established that such a
conflict invoked a greater degree of deference for the agency's interpreta-
tion. 51 Given the greater deference, and perhaps controlling weight,52 al-
47. See Saunders, supra note 8, at 358-67.
48. See, eg., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) ("[A] court is not required to
give effect to an interpretative regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administra-
tive interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency's position, and
the nature of its expertise.")(citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976); Mor-
ton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944));
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970)("While... HEW's construction commands less than
the usual deference that may be accorded an administrative interpretation based on its expertise, it is
entitled to weight as the attempt of an experienced agency to harmonize an obscure enactment with
the basic structure of a program it administers."); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d
1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(CA high degree [of deference] is appropriate ... when the agency's expertise
can help in assessing the effects of competing interpretations upon the policies of the statute (and
hence assessing the interpretation which a wise Congress should be presumed to have intended).");
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982)("[D]eference is not a uni-
tary concept, to be applied with equal force to all issues in a case. If some issues involve scientific
expertise and others do not, the agency will receive greater deference on the issues that do.").
49. But see Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 297
(1986)("[Earlier] decisions indicated that the degree of deference to which an interpretation would
be entitled depended upon such factors as whether the agency's interpretation had been consistent
over a long period, whether the agency had helped shepherd the legislation through Congress,
whether the agency's interpretation was adopted near the time the statute was passed, and whether
the agency possessed any special expertise.... Chevron ... specifically found irrelevant the first of
these commom-sense factors, and... has cast doubt upon the others."). Judge Starr did not, how-
ever, argue that Chevron eliminated any role for technical expertise. Furthermore, he was concerned
with the continued existence of sliding scales of deference. While Chevron may well do away with
such sliding scales in all instances in which it applies, the factors that once resolved the question of
where on the sliding scale a court should stand in reviewing an agency interpretation might also
serve as factors to determine whether Chevron applies to the interpretation at issue.
50. The Chevron Court identified, as competing policy concerns, allowing reasonable economic
growth and protecting the environment. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
51. More than a half-century ago this Court declared that "where Congress has committed
to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discre-
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ready due constructions in such circumstances, Chevron would not have
represented as great a change if it had been limited to those situations rather
than applied whenever there was any silence or ambiguity.5 3
The early invocations of Chevron as requiring controlling weight, rather
than merely deference, 54 for agency interpretations involved cases in which
technical expertise was required or in which there was a conflict of poli-
cies.55 A recent decision, however, calls that limitation into question.
D. The Final Erosion of Substantive Review
In Young v. Community Nutrition Institute56 the Court considered the
meaning of a portion of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The
Act bans from interstate commerce any adulterated food, 57 and defines food
as adulterated if it meets any of several criteria, including "if it bears or
contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance ... which is
unsafe within the meaning of section 346 of this title.... ."58 Section 346 in
turn provides:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except
where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot
be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be un-
safe for purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of
this title; but when such substance is so required or cannot be so
tion, his action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by
the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or this court should be of the opinion that
his action was clearly wrong." This admonition has been consistently followed by this
Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subject
to agency regulations.
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (quoting Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106,
108-09 (1904), and citing NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943)).
52. See supra note 51.
53. But see supra note 49.
54. Chevron has also regularly been cited for a grant of deference to the agency construction of
a statute, rather than for the controlling effect Chevron clearly provides. See, e.g., North Am. Tele-
communications Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1291 (7th Cir. 1985.); Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d
32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985); American Cyanamid Co. v. Young, 770 F.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Maine v. United States Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1985); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n
v. EPA, 767 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1985).
55. See, eg., General Elec. Uranium Management Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 764
F.2d 896, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(applying Chevron to grant controlling effect because "the statute is
ambiguous with respect to the specific method of calculating the one-time fee [for the disposal of
spent nuclear fuel], and that DOE's rule 'represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting poli-
cies' served by the Act")(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Granting controlling effect to the
Board's construction of "closely related to banking" in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), the court
stated that "attempting to exercise close and necessarily inexpert supervision of [the Board's] judg-
ments ... would be particularly inappropriate under a governing statute such as this one, which
commits it to the Board to apply a standard of such inherent imprecision ... that a discretion of
almost legislative scope was necessarily contemplated.").
56. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1982).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1982).
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avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quan-
tity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the pro-
tection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so fixed
shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of
clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of this title. While such a regulation is
in effect.., food shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any
added amount of such substance be considered to be adulterated.. .. 59
The substance at issue in Community Nutrition was aflatoxin, a carcino-
genic product of molds growing on some foods. There was no dispute that
aflatoxin was, for purposes of section 346, considered added and unavoida-
ble. At issue was the procedure which the agency was required to follow
before aflatoxin contaminated foods could escape the sweep of section
342(a)(2)(A) and the resultant ban from interstate commerce. Community
Nutrition Institute argued that such foods were adulterated unless the Secre-
tary established a tolerance for the presence of aflatoxin, and no such toler-
ances had been established. The FDA argued that section 346 did not
require the establishment of such tolerances before foods with added, una-
voidable, poisonous or deleterious substances could be shipped in interstate
commerce.
The statutory construction question revolved around the clause "the
Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the amount therein or
thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public
health. . . ."6 If "shall" were read to require the Secretary to promulgate
tolerances, the failure of the Secretary to so act would by definition have left
the food adulterated. If "shall" did not require such action, the FDA might
be free to continue regulating aflatoxin contaminated foods using its infor-
mally adopted "action levels."'61
The Court found the word "shall" to be ambiguous. While the word
itself might appear to admit of no ambiguity and clearly to express a require-
ment, the Court held that the presence of the modifying phrase "to such
extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health" created an
ambiguity. Under the Community Nutrition Institute's construction, the
phrase modified "limiting the quantity" and indicated how the levels that
would be tolerated were to be determined. Under the FDA's construction,
the phrase modified "shall" and indicated that the Secretary was to make the
determination as to whether it would require limiting regulations to protect
public health. If the Secretary decided such regulations were necessary, the
Secretary was then to set tolerances.
The Court began its analysis with Chevron's holding that
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.... [A] court may not substi-
59. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982).
60. Id.
61. The action levels were adopted without the notice and comment procedures that the APA
section 706 would require for rulemaking. Since the District of Columbia Circuit had held that
tolerances had to be formally adopted, it did not determine what formalities must be followed in the
adoption of action levels. That issue, therefore, was not before the Supreme Court.
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tute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable in-
terpretation made by the administrator of an agency. 62
While agreeing with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Community Nu-
trition Institute's reading of the statutory language was the more natural
reading, the Court determined that the FDA's construction was also a per-
missible reading. The Court justified allowing the FDA's awkward con-
struction by noting that
[a]s enemies of the dangling participle well know, the English language
does not always force a writer to specify which of two possible objects
is the one to which a modifying phrase relates. A Congress more pre-
cise or more prescient than the one that enacted § 346 might, if it
wished petitioner's position to prevail, have placed "to such extent as
he finds necessary to the protection of public health" as an appositive
phrase immediately after "shall" rather than as a free-floating phrase
after "the quantity therein or thereon." A Congress equally fastidious
and foresighted, but intending respondents' position to prevail, might
have substituted the phrase "to the quantity" for the phrase "to such
extent as." But the Congress that actually enacted § 346 took neither
tack. In the absence of such improvements, the wording of § 346 must
remain ambiguous.63
The Court then found the "FDA's interpretation of § 346 to be sufficiently
rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the
FDA."64
Several points should be noted from Community Nutrition. First, as-
suming arguendo that there is a legitimate ambiguity in the statute, there is
simply nothing to indicate that it is the sort of ambiguity which Congress
would have delegated to an administrative agency for resolution. There is
certainly no express delegation, as in the Batterton line of cases, that could
be read as changing, for the specific statutes involved, the APA directive that
the courts were to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action."'65
Nor is the ambiguity technical or indicative of a need to resolve conflict-
ing policies. The word "shall" is by no means a technical term requiring the
expertise of an administrative agency to provide the proper construction.
Furthermore, while a conflict might be found in policies regarding the safety
of the food supply and the economic detriment caused by setting tolerances
at too low a level, that policy conflict need not revolve around the meaning
of "shall." Instead it might provide legislative effect for the tolerances the
FDA established, but should not determine whether the FDA must take
steps to establish tolerances. That determination is one of pure statutory
construction not requiring any particular non-legal expertise. In construing
62. Community Nutrition, 476 U.S. at 979-81 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44).
63. Id. at 979-83.
64. Id. at 981-83. The Court preceeded the language quoted with its own quotation from a case
affording considerable deference to an agency construction. However, given the Court's conclusion
that a court would be precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the FDA, Community
Nutrition clearly assigned controlling weight, rather than mere deference, to the view of the FDA.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
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"shall," the court would not balance policies, but would merely require the
FDA to formally, rather than informally, balance those policies.
Since the ambiguity was not technical or indicative of a policy conflict,
it is more difficult to argue that Congress superceded the APA directive to
the courts to construe. Where Congress used an ambiguous technical term
or any ambiguous term requiring technical expertise to determine the best
construction,66 it might be reasonable to conclude that Congress intended
the expert administrative agency to construe the term. Similarly, if constru-
ing the term requires a balancing of policies that Congress chose not to
unambiguously and precisely balance, it might be reasonable to conclude
that Congress did not mean for a lay court, rather than an expert agency, to
fine-tune that balance. Thus, in the case of a technical ambiguity or one
involving policy conflict, the Chevron finding of an implicit delegation to the
agency to construe, and the implied superceding of the APA directive to the
courts to construe, is within the realm of reason. Without such an ambigu-
ity, there seems little or no basis to conclude that Congress' explicit directive
to the courts to construe has been superceded.
Another problem presented by Community Nutrition is the weakness of
the claim that there is any ambiguity at all. As Justice Stevens stated in
dissent,
[t]o one versed in the English language, the meaning of this provision
is readily apparent. The plain language of the section tells us when the
Secretary's duty to promulgate regulations arises ... ; it tells us the
purpose of the regulations... ; and it tells us what standard he should
employ in drafting them-"to such extent as he finds necessary for the
protection of public health." 67
Justice Stevens went on to state that "[t]he Court's finding of ambiguity is
simply untenable." 68 As Judge Starr, the author of the D.C. Circuit's unani-
mous opinion in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,69 said in reaction
to the Supreme Court's approach, "[a]mbiguity seem[ed] to have taken on
epidemic proportions." 70
In addition to criticizing the majority's reading of the statutory lan-
66. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), the phrase at issue was "closely related to banking." Such a phrase does not involve any
terms that are themselves technical, but technical expertise would be required to decide whether a
particular service is closely related to banking for purposes of the statute.
67. Community Nutrition, 476 U.S. at 983-86 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
68. Id., at 985-86.
69. 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
70. Panel Discussion at the Fall Meeting of the Section of Administrative Law (Oct. 10, 1986,
Washington, D.C.) printed in Starr, Sunstein, Willard & Morrison, Judicial Review ofAdministrative
Action in a Conservative Era, 39 AzMIN. L. REv. 353, 362 (1987).
As is with some frequency the case with a purported epidemic, the seeming increase in inci-
dence may be the result of a change in reporting rather than a spread of the disease. The blame may
be not so much with a loss of congressional ability to write nonambiguous statutes as with the
Supreme Court's willingness to find the disease in statutes bearing less than convincing symptoms.
But see Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 995, 996 (1987)(The will of the
national legislature is too often expressed in commands that are unclear, imprecise, or gap-rid-
den .... "); Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in
Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L. RPv. 385, 424-25 (1983)("We are choking, not on
statutes in general, but on ambiguous and internally inconsistent statutes.").
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guage, Justice Stevens appeared to criticize the role the Court assumed in
reviewing agency statutory constructions.
The task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely in-
venting an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference. A statute
is not "unclear unless we think there are decent arguments for each of
the competing interpretations of it." Thus, to say that the statute is
susceptible of two meanings, as does the Court, is not to say that either
is acceptable. 71
The first sentence quoted speaks to the weakness of the claim of ambiguity
but perhaps unfairly suggests that the majority invented the ambiguity. The
ambiguity, if there was one at all, was shown by the varying interpretations
presented by the litigants. Perhaps the sentence should have read: "The task
of interpreting a statute requires more than merely accepting the existence of
varying interpretations as showing ambiguity and invoking administrative
deference." That is, true ambiguity requires more than competing interpre-
tations; the existence of those competing interpretations must be the result of
a real ambiguity in the language.
The remainder of the quoted language is another way of observing that
in applying Chevron,
not just any silence or ambiguity should suffice. In any case involving
statutory construction, the parties offer different interpretations. Even
the most common words may admit of two or more meanings and thus
be ambiguous. If Congress has not addressed which of the offered con-
structions was intended, Congress has been silent on the specific issue.
Surely the Chevron Court did not mean that courts should grant con-
trolling weight to the agency position in all statutory construction
questions. 72
Chevron did, after all, leave the judiciary with the final authority regarding
statutory construction and stated that courts "must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."73
If the courts are to play any role at all, Justice Stevens may have set the
minimum for that role by requiring that the Court examine the offered
meanings to ensure that there are "decent arguments for each of two com-
peting interpretations . . . [and] that either is acceptable." 74 Such an ap-
proach does not restrict Chevron to the cases of technical ambiguity or
ambiguity representing a conflict of policies that better justify countering the
APA mandate and granting the agency view controlling weight.75 Never-
theless, such an approach presents an advantage over the majority approach
in that at least only real ambiguities result in the grant of controlling weight.
The effect of the majority opinion in Community Nutrition is to grant
controlling weight to any agency construction of a statute it administers. 76
71. Community Nutrition, 476 U.S. at 987-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 352 (1986)).
72. Saunders, supra note 8, at 359 (footnotes omitted).
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
74. See supra text accompanying note 71.
75. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
76. See Note, The Chevron Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the
Confusion, 73 CORNELL L. Rxv. 113, 129-32 (1987).
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There appears to be no requirement that the resolution of the ambiguity
require any agency expertise nor any requirement that there be any sign,
other than silence, that Congress left the resolution of the ambiguity to the
agency. Furthermore, even an extremely weak claim of ambiguity appears
sufficient to invoke controlling weight. Presumably an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" reading of the statute would not suffice to establish the existence of an
ambiguity. But that, of course, is the standard under which the courts
would review the agency's resolution of the ambiguity. Thus, any meaning
an agency can read into a statute, without being arbitrary and capricious,
serves to establish an ambiguity when contrasted With the reading offered by
the adverse party. The agency view then has controlling effect, and since the
reading would not be arbitrary and capricious, the agency construction will
withstand review.
At this point the only issue becomes whether the agency's construction
is arbitrary and capricious, the same issue presented in review of a legislative
rule. The differences in review accorded the two types of rules in the APA
are glossed over by the court, which takes away the lower courts' duty and
authority, assigned to them by Congress, to "decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 77
It is, of course, possible that Community Nutrition will not be read as
strongly as suggested here.78 But, if Community Nutrition is not to be taken
as strongly as has been suggested, the Court has left lower courts with no
guidance as to when an agency's construction is to control. The existence of
a technical ambiguity or an ambiguity representing a conflict of policies was
a viable standard,79 but it is a standard not met by Community Nutrition.
That the alternative readings not be arbitrary and capricious is also a stan-
dard, but, as has been shown, it is a standard that breaks down the distinc-
tion between the standards of review for interpretative rules and legislative
rules. If the Court does not intend this total blending of the two types of
rule, for the purpose of providing the standard of review, it is incumbent on
the Court to establish a principle for distinguishing which interpretations are
still to receive the higher scrutiny envisioned by the APA.
The Court arguably provided such a principle in Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca.80 There, the Court compared the two
methods through which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that his
deportation will lead to persecution can seek relief. Section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act8l relieves the alien from deportation if
77. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
78. Community Nutrition may, in fact, be a case of bad facts making bad law. The Grocery
Manufacturers Association maintained that, under the District of Columbia Circuit opinion, "virtu-
ally the entire U.S. food supply would remain unlawful for decades to come." Leflar, Toxins in the
Food Supply: Must FDA Allow Public Participation in Setting Permissible Levels?, 15 PREvIEw oF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CAsES 446, 447 (1986). The Court might not see fit to extend
Community Nutrition to cases in which the facts do not present such practical problems, by some-
how seeking to distinguish cases.
79. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
80. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
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he can show that, on account of one of various listed factors, his "life or
freedom would be threatened."' 82 The Court had earlier determined in Im-
migration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic 83 that this showing was made
if the alien could demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that the alien
would be subject to persecution" if returned to the country to which he was
to be deported. 84 A second basis for relief from deportation is also available.
Section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 198085 provides discretion to the Attor-
ney General to grant asylum to an alien who will not or can not return home
"because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion."'86
In Cardoza-Fonseca, a Nicaraguan, who had illegally remained in the
United States, sought to avoid deportation under both bases. She was unable
to show that it was "more likely than not" that her "life or freedom would
be threatened" as required by section 243. The Bureau of Immigration Ap-
peals then imported the "more likely than not" standard of section 243 into
the section 208 consideration of whether she had a well-founded fear. The
Court decided it was not more likely than not that Cardoza-Fonseca would
be persecuted. The Court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice erred when it interpreted the "well-founded fear" standard of section
208 as being equivalent to the "more likely than not" standard of section 243
and that section 208 was, in fact, more generous to the alien.
The Court did not grant the Bureau of Immigration Appeals' construc-
tion controlling effect. The Court cited and relied on Chevron, but in dis-
cussing Chevron stated:
The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to
decide....
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the
same is, of course, quite different from the question of interpretation
that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either
or both standards to a particular set of facts. There is obviously some
ambiguity in a term like "well-founded fear" which can only be given
concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In
that process of filling "'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con-
gress,'" the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to
which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the
statutory program.... But our task today is much narrower, and is
well within the province of the judiciary. We do not attempt to set
forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should be
applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the
82. Id.
83. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
84. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429-30.
85. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
86. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)).
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BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical.8 7
Justice Scalia, while concurring in the judgment on the grounds that
Congress had clearly spoken and that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's construction was in conflict with that clearly expressed intent, criti-
cized the Court's discussion of Chevron.88
Several lower court opinions treated Cardoza-Fonseca as changing the
Chevron grant of controlling effect to agency interpretations. 89 In response,
Justice Scalia, this time joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and O'Connor, stepped into the breach to show those courts the error of
their ways. Concurring in National Labor Relations Board v. United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,90 he explained how the Court's
treatment of the case before it "demonstrates the continuing and unchanged
vitality of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set
forth in Chevron."91
The majority in United Food Workers stated that it would review the
regulations in question under the Cardoza-Fonseca standard. "On a pure
question of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine con-
gressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory construction.' If we
can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations
at issue must be fully consistent with it." z92 The Court also cited Chevron as
support for that proposition and observed that "where 'the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.' -93
The Court appeared to treat Cardoza-Fonseca as not being a departure
from Chevron. In fact, as Justice Scalia explained,
[i]f the dicta of Cardoza-Fonseca, as opposed to its expressed adherence
to Chevron, were applied here, surely the question whether dismissal of
87. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1220-21 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)))(footnotes omitted).
88. The Court's discussion is flatly inconsistent with... well established interpretation.
The Court first implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that
of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction," they are
able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute. . . . But this
approach would make deference [to authority] a doctrine of desperation, authorizing
courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue.
This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.
The Court also implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for
that of an agency whenever they face "a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide,"... rather than a "question of interpretation [in which] the agency is
required to apply [a legal standard] to a particular set of facts." ... No support is adduced
for this proposition, which is contradicted by the case the Court purports to be interpret-
ing, since in Chevron the Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's ab-
stract interpretation of the phrase "stationary source."
Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1225 (Scalia, J., concurring)(insertions by Justice Scalia).
89. See, eg., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 113
(D.C. Cir 1987); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agric. Implement Work-
ers v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d
587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1987).
90. 108 S. Ct 413 (1987).
91. United Food Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 426 (Scalia, I., concurring).
92. United Food Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 421 (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207).
93. Id at 421 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
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complaints requires Board approval and thus qualifies for judicial re-
view under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) would be "a pure question of statutory
construction" rather than the application of a "standard... to a par-
ticular set of facts," as to which "the courts must respect the interpre-
tation of the agency." Were we to follow those dicta, therefore, we
would be deciding this issue conclusively and authoritatively, rather
than merely "decid[ing] whether the agency's regulatory placement is
permissible. .... -94
Thus, Cardoza-Fonseca may not be a departure from, or a limitation on,
Chevron. If the Court does not intend the blending, for purposes of standard
of review, of the two types of rule, seemingly complete with Community
Nutrition, it is still incumbent upon the Court to establish some principle to
distinguish those interpretations which are to receive the higher scrutiny en-
visioned by the APA from those due controlling effect.
II. A SEARCH FOR LIMITS
This Article suggests three limitations on the range of agency statutory
interpretations that are afforded controlling effect when challenged in court.
The first limitation is that when a statute contains congressional instructions
to the agency as to how the agency is to function, the agency's construction
of that statute should not control. The second limitation is based on the sort
of ambiguity present in the statute. Arguably, that ambiguity must be tech-
nical or reflect a need to balance policies, so that there is a basis for conclud-
ing that the resolution of the ambiguity requires the agency's expertise. The
contours of the third limitation are not developed within the confines of this
Article. Instead, this Article simply points out that the nondelegation doc-
trine, should its recent stirrings lead to a rebirth, applies to agency statutory
constructions in whatever form the reborn doctrine might take.
A. A Limitation Based on the Entity Toward Which the
Statute Is Directed
Community Nutrition was viewed as representing a step towards expan-
sion of the class of agency constructions due controlling effect, because the
ambiguity, if indeed there was any real ambiguity, was nori-technical and
there was no reason to leave its resolution to the agency, other than the view
that any ambiguity represents an implicit delegation of such authority to the
agency. Even accepting the view that the existence of any ambiguity may
generally be taken as a delegation to the agency to construe with controlling
effect, that position should not apply to cases such as Community Nutrition.
That case departs from the precedent of the other cases presented in another
important way.
In each of the major cases addressing the development of agency au-
thority to construe with controlling effect, the ambiguity at issue was not in a
section of the statute directed at the agency as such. Instead, the agency
construed how the statutory section in question applied to some other entity
94. United Food Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 426 (Scalia, J., concurring)(quoting Cardoza.Fonseca,
107 S. Ct. at 1221)(citations omitted).
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to which the section was directed. As will be seen, that was not the case in
Community Nutrition.
In Batterton v. Francis,95 the section at issue was a part of the statute
governing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The sec-
tion "require[d] a participating State to provide assistance where a needy
child 'has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unem-
ployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary) of his father.' "96 The standards prescribed by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare required the states to define "unemployed
father" to include any father working less than 100 hours per month or who
exceeded 100 hours in a particular month as the result of a temporary in-
crease in work that had provided less than 100 hours the previous month
and was likely to provide under 100 hours of work in the following month.97
The regulations also, however, allowed an exception. States "need not in-
clude a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor
dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which
result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation
under the State's unemployment compensation law." 98 Maryland chose not
to include such unemployed fathers. 99
As previously noted, at issue in Batterton was whether or not the Secre-
tary could define "unemployed" so as to allow the exception of fathers who
were not working as a result of participation in a strike or as a result of a
discharge for proper cause.100 The Court found that Congress explicitly del-
egated the authority to define "unemployed" to the Secretary and granted
the Secretary's definition controlling effect.
For purposes of the distinction being drawn in this section it is impor-
tant to note that the dispute in Batterton was between the State of Maryland
and several recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The
statute the Secretary construed established the rights and duties of those par-
ties with regard to one another. The statutory language in issue did not
impose duties on the Secretary nor grant the Secretary any rights. It did,
however, provide the Secretary with the power' 01 to affect the rights and
duties of the states and potential recipients of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children.
Similarly, the focus of the statute at issue in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 102 was not directed at the adminis-
trative agency. Rather, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977103 ad-
dressed a state's failure to comply with air quality standards adopted
95. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
96. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 419 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976)).
97. Id at 417 n.l (citing 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1976)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 420 n.5 (citing COMAR § 07.02.09.10(A)(2) (1975)).
100. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
101. A power is the ability to bring about a change in legal relationships, e.g., the ability to
create rights or duties. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 44-58 (1913).
102. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
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pursuant to earlier legislation. The statute required non-conforming states
to develop a permit program for every new or modified "stationary
source" 104 of air pollution. In implementing the amendments, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency allowed states to adopt plantwide definitions of
''stationary source."
As in Batterton, the Court's finding of an implicit delegation to the
agency to construe "stationary source", meant finding that the agency pos-
sessed express power to affect the rights and duties of others,10 5 in this case
states and owners of sources of emission. The power the agency enjoyed was
not one that allowed it to define its own rights and duties. That is not to say
that the administrative agency in Chevron or in Batterton did not have inter-
ests affected by its decision, nor that its rights and duties with regard to
enforcement, for example, would not be affected indirectly. The rights and
duties directly affected by the delegated power to construe the statutory
term, however, were the rights and duties of others.
The situation was quite different in Community Nutrition. There the
statutory language at issue directly addressed the administrative agency.
The statute stated, "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations.. .,"6 and
the administrative agency had construed the term "shall." The statute im-
posed a duty on the agency. There may have been some question as to the
scope of that duty,107 but that the statute did place a duty on the agency is
certain.
By granting the agency's construction of the statute controlling effect,
the Court allowed the agency to establish its own rights and duties subject
only to "arbitrary and capricious" review.108 Such a power to establish
one's own rights and duties goes far beyond the power granted in the statutes
at issue in Batterton and Chevron. The Court's decision effectively made the
agency the judge of its own case with regard to the nature of its duties,
subject only to "arbitrary and capricious" review.
Allowing a party to be the judge of its own case cuts against the grain of
American justice. As the Supreme Court stated in one of the earliest cases,
"surely the legislature could not mean to make a man the judge both of fact
and law in his own cause, and that without appeal."10 9 Indeed, Justice
104. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 101.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982).
107. That is, whether tolerances must be established limiting quantities of unavoidable deleteri-
ous substances to levels necessary for the protection of public health, or whether the tolerances need
only be established if such establishment was necessary for the protection of public health. See supra
notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
108. Community Nutrition thus bears out one of Professor Sunstein's criticisms of Chevron.
Chevron suggests that administrators should decide the scope of their own authority.
That notion flatly contradicts separation of power principles that date back to Marbury v.
Madison and to The Federalist No. 78. The case for judicial review depends in part on the
proposition that foxes should not guard henhouses-an injunction to which Chevron ap-
pears deaf.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 421, 467 (1987)(footnotes
omitted).
109. Penman v. Wayne, 1 U.S. 241, 243 (1788). While there may be appeal in the case of an
agency construction, the appeal under arbitrary-and-capricious review does little to keep the agency
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Chase, in Calder v. Bull,'10 opined that with regard to "a law that makes a
man a judge in his own cause... : It is against all reason and justice, for a
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot
be presumed that they have done it.""'
One may disagree with Justice Chase's views in Calder regarding sub-
stantive due process, and might argue that a rational constitution could
grant the legislature the authority to make a man the judge of his own cause
and might even presume that Congress in fact has such authority.112 Yet,
given the fundamental principle that a man should not be the judge of his
own cause, 13 surely the legislature should not be presumed to have made
the administrative agencies the judges of their own rights and duties. Even if
Congress might explicitly delegate such authority, that authority should not
be found in some implicit grant.
While Community Nutrition has been singled out as a departure from
the earlier cases in the development of authority to construe statutes with
controlling effect, it would be misleading to suggest that Community Nutri-
tion stands alone. Another example of the Court making an administrative
agency the judge of its own cause found in Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 114 This case arose after the
Environmental Protection Agency, also a petitioner before the Court, was
from being the judge of its own cause, so long as the agency's view of its rights and duties is
reasonable.
110. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
111. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in original).
112. In fact, the Supreme Court appears; to some degree, to have treated Congress as the judge
of its own cause in determining its authority under the commerce clause. For example, in Hodel v.
Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981), and its companion case, Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981), the Court noted that its proper inquiry was merely whether
Congress could rationally conclude that the activity it was regulating affected interstate commerce.
If so, the legislation at issue would be within the commerce clause power. Thus, Congress was to
determine its own authority with much the same scope of review as has here been criticized when
afforded to agency determiniations of their authority. Congress is, in such cases however, finding
legislative facts, as opposed to ruling on legal questions as to the meaning of statutory terms. Fur-
thermore, the thesis of this section does not rest on the conclusion that Congress could not establish
for itself and for the administrative agencies the authority to be the judges in their own causes, but
merely that Congress should not be presumed to have placed the agencies in such a position by
implication.
113. See also, eg., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974)(White, J., dissenting)("[W]e
might start with a first principle: '[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause.' ")(quoting Bonham's
Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610)); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 n.17 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)("Three principles of 'natural jus-
tice' were stated to be that 'a man may not be a judge in his own cause' .. ")(quoting Report on
Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, 75-80); Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. 264, 266
(1857)("The act of Congress proceeds upon an acknowledgment of the maxim, 'that a man should
not be the judge in his own cause,' .. "); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 462, 464 (9th
Cir. 1979)(" 'even an Act of Parliament made against Natural Equity, as to make a Man Judge in his
own Cause, is void in itself...')(quoting Day v. Savadge, Hob. 84 (K.B. 1614)); NLRB v. River-
side Mfg. Co., 119 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (5th Cir. 1941)(noting "principles, at once of natural right and
of constitutional law, that no man may be a judge in his own cause.. ."); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
NLRB, 112 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1940)(same language); American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Pow-
ell, 298 F. 417, 422 (1924)("Courts have been ever jealous to assert and enforce the principle that no
man can be a judge in his own cause .. "); Hodgson v. District No. Five, United Mine Workers of
Am., 353 F. Supp. 108, 115 (W.D. Pa. 1973)("It is fundamental in our law that a man cannot judge
his own cause .... ).
114. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
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required by the Clean Water Act 115 to set effluent limits for various catego-
ries of pollutants. The Act also stated that the agency could not "modify"
certain statutory requirements regarding toxic materials. The issue before
the Court was what constituted modification. The Court, while using defer-
ential language, held that the agency's "understanding of this very 'complex
statute' is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its
judgment for that of the EPA." 116
The Court in Chemical Manufacturers, like the Court in Community
Nutrition, allowed the agency to be the judge of its own case, subject only to
"arbitrary and capricious" review. At issue in Chemical Manufacturers was
a statutory section defining the authority of the agency, rather than one de-
fining the rights and duties of other parties. While Congress might have
implicitly delegated to the agency the authority to construe statutory sec-
tions setting the rights and duties of others, it is not reasonable to conclude
that Congress would set limits on the agency's authority while, at the same
time, implicitly delegating to the agency the authority to delineate those lim-
its with preclusive effect. To have done so would be to have made the
agency the judge of its own cause.
In both Community Nutrition and Chemical Manufacturers the Court
applied principles of implicit delegation of authority to the agency to con-
strue a statute without addressing the fact that the two cases were inherently
different from the cases in which those principles developed. Even if Con-
gress may delegate to an agency the authority to judge its own cause in such
cases of statutory construction, it is unreasonable to presume that Congress
has done so implicitly. Authority to construe with controlling effect should
not be taken as implied when the agency construes a statutory section which
is directed to the agency and sets the agency's powers, rights, duties and
limitations.1 17 In such cases, the agency may still be faced with situations in
which it must offer its construction of a statute directed toward itself, and
such a construction might even be due deference, but the construction
should not be given controlling effect.' 18
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
116. Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 105 (citing Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87
(1975); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
117. Judge Starr, supra note 70, at 363, finds in his reading of the cases a principle that is some-
what analogous to that argued for in the text. He notes that controlling weight is due interpretative
rules based on managerial or regulatory judgment, but observes that such effect may not be due rules
interpreting a congressional grant ofjurisdiction. While sympathetic to the principle he would find,
I do not agree, given the cases discussed in text, that such a principle can be taken as established.
The arguments presented in text, however, show that his principle has merit, even if it does not yet
have a following.
The principle presented by Judge Starr, as well as the principle argued for in this section, also
finds support in the Supreme Court's treatment of preclusion of judicial review of agency decisions.
"[E]ven when a statute cuts off judicial review, review will be afforded if the agency exceeds its
statutory authority." B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, 5 ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW § 44.02, at 44-
10 (1987)(citing Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184
(1958)). The courts must be willing to decide whether the agency has the power it asserted, even in
areas where Congress has said that the courts may not examine the substantive decisions of the
agency. Thus, there is a difference between decisions made under a statute and decisions regarding
the powers, rights, duties, etc. the statute grants the agency.
118. It may not always be easy to distinguish cases in which the statute is directed toward the
agency and circumscribes the agency's rights and duties from cases in which the statute, while estab-
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B. A Limitation Based on the Administrative Procedure Act
Section 10(e) of the APA, when adopted in 1946, provided that "[s]o far
as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall de-
cide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any
agency action."1 1 9 This provision has remained in effect in essentially the
same form since that time. 120
The statute clearly states that it is the courts that are to decide ques-
tions of law and construe statutes, and does not exempt situations in which
the administrative agency has already offered a statutory construction. Fur-
thermore, the legislative history of the APA provides no grounds for the
position that such agency constructions are to be given controlling effect and
may be changed by a court only if found to be arbitrary and capricious. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained that "subsection [10(e)] pro-
vides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in
the last analysis." 12 1 The House Committee on the Judiciary offered the
same explanation.' 22 In fact, the Senate Committee's discussion of the bill
noted that "'interpretative' rules-as merely interpretations of statutory
provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review."1 23 This is a far cry from
the controlling effect now given some, if not all, interpretative rules.
Given this early and consistent statement of congressional intent re-
garding who was to interpret the law, it is difficult to justify the Court's
position in granting controlling effect to such a wide range of agency con-
structions. Cases such as Batterton 124 present little problem, since in such
cases an explicit grant to the agency to construe the particular term or stat-
ute superceded the APA's explicit assignment to the courts of the task of
construing statutes.' 25 However, the range of statutes for which the
agency's view is to be given controlling effect goes beyond such explicit dele-
lishing rights and duties of others, has an incidental effect on the agency's powers. However, there
are cases in which the statute is clearly directed toward setting rights and duties of agencies. See,
eg., Community Nutrition, 476 U.S. 974. In those cases, at least, the limitation should apply. In the
more difficult cases, the decision might be made to deny controlling effect to those aspects of the
interpretations that did affect the agency's powers in any more than a minimal, purely incidental
way.
119. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
120. The current version of the Adminstrative Procedure Act provides: "To the extent necessary
to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, inter-
pret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action." See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
121. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 185, 214 (1946).
122. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 233, 278 (1946).
123. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1946) in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11, 18 (1946)(emphasis added).
124. Batterton, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). Batterton does not stand alone. In various instances, the
Court has found an explicit delegation of the authority to construe. See, e.g., United States v. Mor-
ton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983); Herwig v. Ray, 455
U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981); INS v. Jong Ha
Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981). In each such case, the APA's assignment of the role to the courts
may be viewed as having been explicitly superceded by the statute at issue.
125. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
1988]
HeinOnline -- 30 Ariz. L. Rev.  791 1988
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
gation to construe. 126
The extension of this line of cases from Batterton and its progeny 127 to
Chevron and beyond is where the difficulty arises. Chevron rested on the
existence of an implicit delegation to the administrative agency of the au-
thority to construe a statute. 128 In effect, the Court found an ambiguity in
the statute that implied repeal of the APA directive that the courts are to
construe statutory terms. Yet, it is a firmly established principle of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are disfavored. 129 That is not to say
that a statute may never be repealed by implication, but that the implication
must be necessary. 130 Moreover, the legislative intent to repeal must be
clear and manifest. 131 This should be particularly so for any repeal by impli-
cation of APA provisions, since the APA itself provides that its provisions
should not be held to have been superceded or modified by a later statute
"except to the extent that it does so expressly."' 132
The mere existence of ambiguity in a statute falls short of demonstrat-
ing "clear and manifest" intention to repeal the APA assignment of the au-
thority to construe to the judiciary.133 Certainly, such an implication is not
"necessary." Implicit repeal is found only where the two acts are in irrecon-
cilable conflict, or where the latter statute "covers the whole ground occu-
126. See supra notes 34-66 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 124.
128. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.") (footnotes omitted).
129. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976). See also, eg.,
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978)("To find a repeal... under these circumstances would surely
do violence to the 'cardinal rule... that repeals by implication are not favored.' ")(quoting Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974)(quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936))); Radzanower v. Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)(" 'It is, of course, a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.' ")(quoting United
States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) and citing Gordon v. New York
Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133
(1974); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308
U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939)); Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 262 (I896)("[W]here Congress
has expressly legislated in respect to a given matter that express legislation must control, in the
absence of subsequent legislation equally express, and is not overthrown by any mere inferences or
implications to be found in subsequent legislation."); Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 686 (1891)("Noth-
ing is better settled than that repeals ... by implication, are not favored by the courts .. "); Osborn
v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654, 662 (1871)("The doctrines of the repeal of statutes and the destruction of
vested rights by implication, are alike unfavored in the law.").
130. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936).
131. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978)(quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S.
497, 503 (1936), and citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945)("Only a
clear repugnancy between the old.., and the new [law] results in the former giving way .. ");
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939)("[I]ntention of the legislature to repeal
'must be clear and manifest' .... [A] positive repugnancy [between the old and new laws]' ")). See
also Radzanower v. Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)(" 'the intention of the legislature
to repeal must be clear and manifest' ")(quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936)); Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654, 662 (1871)(repeal by implication is not to be admitted
"unless the implication is so clear as to be equivalent to an explicit declaration").
132. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1982).
133. It might be argued that the APA, rather than assigning the role to the judiciary, simply
recognized the constitutional role of the judiciary in deciding cases arising under federal statutes.
Such an argument would not weaken the argument presented here. Congress could not be supposed
to have exercised its authority to define the jurisdiction of courts by implication through having left
some ambiguity in a substantive statute.
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pied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it.' 34
There is nothing irreconcilable between the existence of an ambiguity in
a statutory term or provision and the APA's directive in section 10(e) to
reviewing courts to interpret statutory provisions. 13 5 The later, substantive
statute creates an ambiguity and the APA assigns the resolution of the ambi-
guity to the courts.
Neither would the existence of an ambiguity in a statute directed to, or
administered by, an administrative agency "[cover] the whole ground occu-
pied by [Section 10(e) of the APA] and [be] clearly intended as a substitute
for it." As the name indicates, the Administrative Procedure Act imple-
mented procedure for the administrative agencies. The sections at issue in
Chevron and its progeny were substantive. The Court did not point to a
procedural section in any of the statutes indicating that the statute was in-
tended to cover the whole ground occupied by Section 10(e). If there had
been such a procedural section, the Court would have faced a situation simi-
lar to Batterton, rather than having to find in the substantive portions of the
statute an implied delegation to the agency to construe. Failing to point to a
procedural section, the Court relied upon substantive sections that normally
would not be expected to serve as a substitute for the APA provision.
There is simply nothing inherent in the existence of an ambiguity in the
statute an agency administers that may serve to repeal the APA assignment
of the authority to construe. It might, therefore, be argued thatethe entire
line of cases, from Chevron on, conflicts with principles well established in an
equally long line of Supreme Court cases. 136 To avoid such a conclusion,
some factor must be identified in the ambiguities present in Chevron and its
progeny that is not present in every statutory ambiguity. If some ambigui-
ties are such as to make clear congressional intent to repeal the APA assign-
ment of the task of statutory construction, at least some of the Chevron line
of cases may not be in conflict with the law of implied repeals.
Two factors13 7 representing the state of the law after Chevron and
before Community Nutrition, might provide, either alone or in combination,
a sufficiently clear, though implicit, repeal. The first instance is one in which
134. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936) (quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106
U.S. 596, 601 (1882)). See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978)(" '[i]n the absence of some
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by impli-
cation is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable' ")(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 550 (1974)); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 295 (1953)(Clark, J., concur-
ring)("There must be a 'positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law, and those of the
old.' ")(quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)); Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682,
686 (1891)(citing McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459 (1861); Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill 221 (1843);
Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1868); Furman v. Nichols, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1868);
United States v. Sixty-seven Packages, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 85 (1854)); Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S.
596 (1882).
135. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 24, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982)("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean-
ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action.").
136. United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668 (1988); Rodriguez v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1391
(1987); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). United States v. United Con-
tinental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976). See also supra note 129.
137. See Saunders, supra note 8, at 360-67.
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the ambiguity reveals congressional uncertainty as to which of two compet-
ing policies should control. If Congress expressed concern over both poli-
cies, but was not clear as to which is to be given greater weight, Congress
might be seen as having left the task of balancing the competing policiesto
the agency. 138 While an explicit grant of rule-making authority or even a
Batterton-like directive that the agency is to define the key term would be
preferable, arguably the use of an ambiguous term reflecting the policy con-
flict is an implicit invitation to some entity to construe the term and balance
the policies. If so, it is more likely that Congress meant for an expert
agency, rather than the courts, to effect the balance.13 9
A second indicator of an implicit repeal of the APA assignment is an
ambiguity in the use of a technical term.140 The construction of such a term
requires technical expertise. If a term is sufficiently technical, and Congress
was unable or unwilling to define it with precision, Congress might be
viewed as having decided to lay out the general contours of the legislation in
question, while leaving it to the expert agency to fill in the details by defining
any ambiguous technical terms. Even if Congress simply failed to recognize
the existence of an ambiguity, arguably Congress intended that the experts
resolve the unrecognized ambiguity. 41
A case not completely on point, but presenting the sort of conclusion a
court should be required to draw before holding the APA assignment to
have been repealed, is presented by Association of Data Processing Servicing
138. The existence of competing policies played a role in the Court's determination that there
was an implicit delegation to the agency of the power to construe in Chevron. The Court recognized
economic growth and protection of the environment as competing goals in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 111(a), 129(b), 301(a), 91 Stat. 685, 704, 747, 770
(1977)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(3), 7502(b)(6), 76020)(1982)). The Court then went on to
state:
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommo-
dation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and rea-
soned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended
to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented
by this case. Perhaps that body consciously desired the administrator to strike the balance
at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not
consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes it matters not which of these things
occurred.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted). See also General Elec. Uranium Management Corp. v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 764 F.2d 896, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(applying arbitrary-and-capricious
review because the court found the statute "ambiguous with respect to the specific method of calcu-
lating the one-time fee, and that DOE's rule 'represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies' served by the Act")(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
139. Congress is as capable as a generalist court of resolving conflicts between competing poli-
cies, and each may be less capable than an agency with expertise or capable of developing such
expertise. Agencies are also more politically accountable than the courts and between the two may
be viewed as the better entity to make policy decisions. Pierce, Chevron and itsAfter-math: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988).
140. The Chevron Court paid some heed to this factor, noting that the regulatory scheme there
at issue was "technical and complex." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
141. Such an argument is clearly weaker than the argument from the deliberate use of an ambig-
uous term. Since it will be difficult to determine whether or not Congress was aware of the existence
of the ambiguity, the argument might better proceed on the assumption that Congress knew what it
was saying, including the fact that the terms it used were ambiguous.
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Organizations v. Board of Governors.142 That case concerned the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956143 and the construction of "closely related to
banking" in the requirement that bank holding companies obtain regulatory
approval before engaging in activities not closely related to banking. 144
Judge (now Justice) Scalia, writing for the court, concluded that "attempting
to exercise close and necessarily inexpert supervision... would be particu-
larly inappropriate under a governing statute such as this one, which com-
mits it to the Board to apply a standard of such inherent imprecision... that
a discretion of almost legislative scope was necessarily contemplated." 145 If
in determining what standard of review an agency statutory construction is
due, a court is willing to conclude that technical ambiguity or the presence
of policy conflict shows that a commitment to the agency to construe "was
necessarily contemplated," then the interpretation might similarly merit leg-
islative effect. 146
Nevertheless, even in cases in which the construction resolves a techni-
cal ambiguity or a conflict between recognized policies, it is still not at all
clear that "the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or [that] the latter
statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly in-
tended as a substitute for it."'147 It is difficult to claim that the simple pres-
ence of a technical term covers the ground of section 10(e) of the APA and is
intended to serve as a substitute for the section itself. The only available
argument is that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the APA assign-
ment of the task of statutory construction and the technical or policy nature
of the term or section to be construed. While such an argument may be less
than convincing, it does serve to avoid the conclusion that Chevron and all
its progeny conflict with the law of implied repeal. If the existence of techni-
cal ambiguity or policy conflict is to provide such a basis, however, the Chev-
ron line of cases must be limited to those cases in which the ambiguity is of
the required sort.148
There are then, thus far, two sets of agency statutory constructions not
142. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
144. The case involved imprecision, which may be viewed as a particular form of ambiguity. In
some cases of ambiguity, a term admits of two meanings, each of which may be rather precise, and
there is a question over which meaning was intended. Imprecision, at least in the context of the case
discussed, is the result of what may be called a "fuzzy" term. Such a term sets a standard, but it is
not a black-and-white standard. Instead, it requires distinctions to be made between shades of grey.
145. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., 745 F.2d at 697.
146. Saunders, supra note 8, argues that, even under such circumstances, legislative effect should
be granted only if the agency has indicated that it wanted the rule to have legislative effect and has
provided the notice and comment procedures required for legislative rules.
147. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 504 (quoting Red Rock, 106 U.S. at 601).
148. While this argument may be weak, when viewed as supporting Chevron, it has strength as a
limitation on Chevron. That is, it may or may not be that the entire Chevron line conflicts with
implied repeal principles, but surely those cases in which the ambiguity is not technical or policy-
based conflict.
A recent note also takes the position that statutory ambiguity is not a sufficient basis to find a
delegation. See Note, Coring the Seedless Grape" A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 993-99 (1987). The note suggests a "multifactor analysis" using
"deference factors" similar to those well-established in Skidmore and its progeny. See supra notes
16-24 and accompanying text.
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due controlling effect: 149 statutes that define agency rights, duties and pow-
ers, and statutes in which the ambiguity is not technical and does not repre-
sent a conflict in recognized policies. It should be noted that while the two
sets are not mutually exclusive, 150 neither are they co-extensive. Community
Nutrition demonstrates non-exclusivity; that is, Community Nutrition comes
within both limitations. The statute there was directed to the agency and
defined the rights and duties of the agency.1 51 Furthermore, the term
"shall," if it was ambiguous at all, did not represent a technical ambiguity or
embody a conflict in policies.
In Chemical Manufacturers, on the other hand, while the term at issue
represented a limitation of agency authority, the term might be held to pres-
ent a technical ambiguity. 152 "Modify" might not seem to be a technical
term, but since the Court was unwilling to read the ban on modification as a
denial of the authority even to correct errors, 153 some judgment as to
whether a change was substantial enough to be a modification would have to
be made, and such a judgment might well be considered technical.15 4
C. A Limitation Based on the Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine, which holds that the legislature may not
delegate its power to administrative agencies,15 5 has not been an important
factor in American political or legal practice for quite some time. In fact, in
1978, Professor Davis concluded that "the statement that the nondelegation
doctrine has failed needs no qualification.... The judicial effort to prevent
legislative delegation has become a complete failure. 1' 56 He noted that there
were only two cases, both then over forty (and now over fifty) years old, in
which the Supreme Court struck down a legislative delegation to any gov-
ernmental body-Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 15 7 and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States.158 Since 1978, however, while there are no
149. Once again, it may be that only the Batterton-like cases of explicit delegations to the agency
to construe should merit controlling effect.
150. Two sets are mutually exclusive, if they have no elements in common.
151. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
152. The statutory construction at issue in Chemical Manufacturers would then be within the
class not due legislative effect because of the limitation based on the statute defining the agency's
rights, duties and powers. It would not, however, be covered by the technical ambiguity limitation.
153. Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 125.
154. In any case in which the statute at issue came within the limitation based on its being
directed to the agency and defining the agency's rights, duties and powers, but in which the term at
issue was technical, the court, if the first limitation was to have effect, would be forced to resolve a
technical ambiguity. It was, however, argued that the presence of such an ambiguity might be
viewed as presenting an irreconcilable conflict with the APA assignment to the courts of the task of
construing. Thus, one could conclude that, in such a case, the agency construction is due controlling
effect despite the fact that the statute defines the agency's authority. The best response to this argu-
ment is that, while the presence of technical ambiguity might conflict with the APA assignment and
show Congressional intent to repeal that assignment, when the APA assignment is coupled with the
principle that a party should not be the judge of its own cause, the combined weight is simply too
great to be overcome by the technical nature of the ambiguity.
155. See generally K. DAVIs, supra note 2, § 10:6, at 149-223.
156. Id. at 150-51.
157. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
158. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
[Vol. 30
HeinOnline -- 30 Ariz. L. Rev.  796 1988
AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
additional holdings that a delegation is unconstitutional, there are some indi-
cations that interest in the nondelegation doctrine is enjoying a rebirth.
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,'5 9
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence stated his position that section 6(b)(5) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970160 was an unconstitutional
delegation by Congress to the Executive of the authority to make "hard pol-
icy choices." 161 He restated his position that "the Act exceeds Congress'
power to delegate legislative authority to nonelected officials" in his dissent
in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan.162 This time Chief
Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist.
The import of the American Petroleum Institute case goes beyond the
existence of a dissent resting on the nondelegation doctrine. Four other
members of the Court also voted to overturn an action taken under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act. They did so after narrowly construing
the Act so as to avoid a nondelegation doctrine problem.163 Thus, for the
first time since 1935, "a majority of the Court found delegation problems in
a regulatory statute."'' 1 In addition, Justice Scalia, not a member of the
Court at the time American Petroleum Institute was decided, expressed some
respect for the doctrine, stating: "Even with all its Frankensteinlike warts,
knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is
worth hewing from the ice."1 65
An interest among commentators has accompanied the Court's new-
found interest in the doctrine. Professors Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robin-
son 166 have called for a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine as a
means of reducing legislation aimed at the creation of purely private bene-
fits 167 and to "[foster] only those regulatory structures that command a con-
sensus and principally create public, not private goods." 168 Others, offering
various rationales generally stress the desirability of returning the task of
policy making to elected officials.169
It is not the purpose of this Article to join the growing chorus calling
for a renewed recognition of the nondelegation doctrine. Nor does the scope
of this Article include the question of what dimensions the reborn doctrine
159. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
160. Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)(codified at
29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
161. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 672-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
162. 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citing J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).
163. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 645-46 (plurality opinion).
164. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1223, 1235 (1985)(excluding from the analysis cases involving "protected freedoms" or per-
sonal rights, which the author discusses elsewhere).
165. Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REG. 25, 28 (July-Aug. 1980).
166. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1982).
167. Id. at 63-64.
168. Id. at 65.
169. See, eg., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND
LEGITIMACY 78-94 (1978); Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 ADMIN. L. REV.
407 (1970); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 297-303 (1969); Schoenbrod, supra note 164;
Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582 (1972).
1988]
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should have. 170 Rather, this Article merely notes that, should the nondele-
gation doctrine be reincarnated in any form that makes it a real limitation on
delegation, that limitation applies to the determination whether a statutory
construction by an administrative agency may enjoy controlling effect.
The claim that the nondelegation doctrine has some bearing on the
grant of controlling weight to agency statutory constructions may, at first,
seem odd. Professor Schwartz defines an "interpretive" rule as a rule clari-
fying or explaining existing laws or regulations, or a statement as to what the
agency thinks a statute means, issued to advise the public of the agency's
view. 171 An agency statutory construction would, then, appear to be an in-
terpretative rule. However, in Schwartz's scheme, it is substantive rules that
are issued pursuant to statutory authority, 172 so it would seem that only
substantive rules, and not interpretative rules, would be subject to the
nondelegation doctrine.
Professor Davis' distinction between legislative and interpretative rules
presents the same difficulty in the applicability of the nondelegation prob-
lem. In Davis' view, "[a] legislative rule is the product of an exercise of
delegated legislative power to make law through rules. An interpretative
rule is any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated legislative
power to make law through rules."' 73 It follows that only legislative rules
are subject to the nondelegation doctrine. Since Davis treats agency statu-
tory constructions as interpretative rules, 174 it would appear that the
nondelegation doctrine would have no application.
The Attorney General's Manual175 presents the same problem. In its
scheme, substantive rules are issued by an agency pursuant to statutory au-
thority to implement the statute, while interpretative rules are issued by an
agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of a statute it ad-
ministers. 176 Once again, there is a gulf between rules that construe statutes
and rules issued pursuant to statutory, and hence delegated, authority.177
Contrary to these indications that the nondelegation doctrine might not
apply to statutory constructions by administrative agencies is the theory
which justifies the grant of controlling effect to such constructions. When, in
170. See, eg., Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEX. L. REv. 469, 493-504 (1985); Schoenbrod, supra note 164, at 1249-89.
171. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 4.6, at 159.
172. Id. at 158-59.
173. K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:8, at 36.
174. See, eg., id. § 7:11, at 56 ("When an administator either gives meaning to a statute or
answers a question that cannot be answered by finding the meaning in the statute, and when he states
in general terms what he is doing, the statement is called 'an interpretative rule,'.....
175. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 4.
176. Id. at 30 n.3.
177. While interpretative or interpretive rules are not issued pursuant to delegated authority, the
authority of administrative agencies to issue such rules is generally recognized. The authority is
found in the necessity of administrators informing their staffs on questions not answered directly by
the statute. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)("The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formula-
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."); K.
DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:11, at 55 ("When Congress enacts a statute and assigns the administration
of it to an agency, the agency encounters questions the statute does not answer and the agency must
answer them. The agency heads must instruct their staffs what to do about such questions, and the
instructions are interpretative rules.").
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Batterton v. Francis,178 the Court firmly established the existence of a class
of agency statutory constructions due controlling effect, it did so on the basis
of a delegation. Since the term "unemployment" was followed in the statute
by the parenthetical "as determined in accordance with standards prescribed
by the Secretary," 179 the Court concluded that "Congress... expressly dele-
gated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what
constitutes 'unemployment' for purposes of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children-Unemployed Fathers eligibility."' 180 It was that delegation which
led the Court to grant the standards adopted by the Secretary legislative or
controlling effect.181
Similarly, when the Court established that an agency's construction of a
statute may be due controlling. effect even in the absence of an explicit dele-
gation, the rationale still rested on the existence of a delegation. In Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,182 the Court stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency. 183
Although the delegation was implicit rather than explicit, the Court's ration-
ale for extending controlling effect requires that the delegation be viewed as
a true delegation. 184
The existence of a delegation to the agency to construe a statute might
make the agency's interpretation a legislative rule.185 The rule-making au-
thority exercised would then be of the sort to which the nondelegation doc-
trine, however weakly, traditionally applies. Even if the rule-making is
viewed as interpretative, 186 and therefore traditionally not the subject of the
nondelegation doctrine, however, 187 the particular strength enjoyed by the
178. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976).
180. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425 (emphasis in original).
181. Id.
182. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
184. See, eg., Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
549, 570 (1985)(arguing that statutes are a source of law with regard to the proper mode of statutory
construction and that the extent of deference to be granted is a function of Congressional intent);
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1983) (arguing that
legislative supremacy requires deference in statutory construction "to the extent that the agency had
been delegated law-making authority").
The grant of more than deference-controlling effect-would similarly be a function of law and
the extent to which the agency has been delegated law-making authority.
185. See Saunders, supra note 8, at 382.
186. In General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), the
court held the agency statutory construction in question was an interpretative rule, so that notice
and comment were not required. The court went on to grant, citing Chevron, at least great deference
and possibly controlling effect.
187. Interpretative rules are regularly distinguished from legislative or substantive rules on the
1988)
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construction is due to the delegation to the agency to construe the statute.
Under either view, there is a delegation, and the nondelegation doctrine,
should it be revived, would have some application.
Given the doctrine's current impotence, it is unclear what the contours
of a nondelegation doctrine limitation would be, should the principle ever be
reinvigorated. Congress might simply be required to spell out the range of
acceptable constructions or the policies that are to be balanced and the
weights they are to be given. That is, Congress might be required merely to
give more guidance to the agencies as they go about their exercise of dele-
gated power to construe statutes.
At the extreme, the doctrine might be viewed as prohibiting the delega-
tion to the agency of the authority to construe statutes with controlling ef-
fect. Such a conclusion would be extreme, but not as extreme as a strict
application of the nondelegation doctrine to all areas of rule-making. Our
government has become so complex that it could not function without grant-
ing rule-making authority to administrative agencies. 188 It is also necessary
that agencies have the authority to issue their interpretations of statutes. 189
It is not necessary, however, that those interpretations enjoy controlling ef-
fect. The nondelegation doctrine, if reborn with sufficient vigor, might deny
Congress the ability to pass to the agencies its authority to write the law and
to define statutory terms, and at the same time pass to the agencies the judi-
ciary's traditional authority to interpret the law.
CONCLUSION
The judiciary's role in the interpretation of statutes administered by ad-
ministrative agencies has undergone a period of decline. In most if not all
cases, the agency view as to the meaning of a statute is now due controlling
effect, and a court may not substitute its view of the meaning of the statute
unless it finds the agency view to be arbitrary and capricious or wholly un-
reasonable. Yet, judicial review is important in a government that relies so
heavily on administrative agencies. "At least where private interests are
sharply implicated, some measure of judicial review is a 'necessary condi-
tion, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power
which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.' "190 The cursory system of
judicial review now given agency constructions of statutes may not rise to
the level required to afford that legitimacy and validity. Hopefully, the limi-
tations this Article suggests will lead to increased judicial review and a con-
comitant increase in the legitimacy and validity of the administrative state.
basis that they are not issued pursuant to delegated power. See supra notes 171-77 and accompany-
ing text.
188. See, eg., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 166, at 5 ("Locke's uncompromising
formulation [of] the delegation ... could not [be] appl[ied] .. . literally in a world of extensive
interactions among [the] branches of government.").
189. See supra note 177.
190. Monaghan, supra note 33, at 1 (quoting L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION 320 (1965)).
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